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Abstract. Wi-Fi Protected Setup is an attempt to simplify configura-
tion of security settings for Wi-Fi networks. It offers, among other meth-
ods, Push-Button Configuration (PBC) for devices with a limited user-
interface. There are however some security issues in PBC. A solution to
these issues was proposed in the form of Tamper-Evident Pairing (TEP).
TEP is based on the Tamper-Evident Announcement (TEA), in which a
device engaging in the key agreement not only sends a payload containing
its Diffie-Hellmann public key, but also sends a hash of this payload in a
special, trustedly secure manner. The idea is that thanks to the special
way in which the hash is sent, the receiver can tell whether or not the
hash was altered by an adversary and if necessary reject it.
Several parameters needed for implementation of TEP have been left
unspecified by its authors. Verification of TEA using the Spin model-
checker has revealed that the value of these parameters is critical for the
security of the protocol. The implementation decision can break the re-
sistance of TEP against man-in-the-middle attacks. We give appropriate
values for these parameters and show how model-checking was applied
to retrieve these values.
Keywords: Security, Model-checking, Spin, Wi-Fi Protected Setup,
Tamper-Evident Pairing
1 Introduction
Security protocols aim at securing communications over networks that are pub-
licly accessible. Depending on the application, they are supposed to ensure se-
curity properties such as authentication, integrity or confidentiality even when
the network is accessible by malicious users, who may intercept and/or adapt
existing, and send new messages. While the specification of such protocols is usu-
ally short and rather natural, designing a secure protocol is notoriously difficult.
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Flaws are often found several years later. One of the sources for the vulnerabil-
ity of such protocols is that their specification is often (deliberately) incomplete.
There are several reasons for the omission of certain details by the designer.
For instance, a protocol may depend on properties of the hardware on which it
is used. It also leaves some room for the implementer of the protocol to make
implementation-dependent choices. The problem with these unspecified param-
eters is that it can be very hard to analyze the effects of specific choices on the
correctness of the protocol itself. Mostly this is due to the fact that the pro-
tocol is specified in such a way that both designer and implementer are either
convinced that the correctness is not influenced by the concrete values of these
parameters, or they assume that theses values are chosen within certain (not
explicitly specified) boundaries.
During the last two decades, formal methods have demonstrated their use-
fulness when designing and analyzing security protocols. They indeed provide
rigorous frameworks and techniques that allow to discover new flaws. For exam-
ple, the ProVerif tool [4] and the AVISPA platform [1] are both dedicated tools
for automatically analyzing security properties. More general purpose model-
checkers, such as Spin [9] and Uppaal [3], are also successfully applied to verify
desired properties of protocol specifications. While this model-checking process
often reveals errors, the absence of errors does in general not imply correctness
of the protocol.
Secure wireless communication is a challenging problem due to the inherently
shared nature of the wireless medium. For wireless home networks, the so-called
Wi-Fi Protected Setup was designed to provide a standard for easy establishment
of a secure connection between a wireless device with a possibly limited interface
(e.g. a webcam or a printer) and a wireless access point. The wireless device, once
connected to the access point, gets not only internet connectivity, but also access
to shared files and content on the network. The standard provides several options
for configuring security settings (referred to as pairing or imprinting). The most
prominent ones are PIN and Push-Button Configuration. The PIN method has
been shown to be vulnerable to brute-force attacks; see [25]. This method and
its weaknesses are briefly discussed in Section 5. To establish a secure connection
using the Push-Button method, the user presses a button on each device within
a certain time-frame, and the devices start broadcasting their Diffie-Hellman
public keys [6], which are used to agree on the encryption key to protect future
communication. In [8] the authors argue that this protocol only protects against
passive adversaries. Since the key exchange messages are not authenticated, the
protocol is vulnerable to an active man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. To protect
key establishment against these MITM attacks, [8] presents a method called
Tamper-Evident Pairing (TEP), that provides simple and secure Wi-Fi pairing
without requiring an out-of-band communication channel (a medium, differing
from the communication channel that is used for transmitting normal data).
The essence of their method is that the chip-sets used in Wi-Fi devices offer the
possibility not only to transmit data, but also to sense the medium to detect
whether or not information is communicated. The correctness of the proposed
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protocol is based on the assumption that an adversary can only change or corrupt
data on the medium but not completely remove the data. The TEP protocol is
specified in a semi-formal way; its correctness is proven manually (i.e. on paper;
not formally using e.g. a theorem prover). However, in the protocol itself some
parameters are used that are not fully specified.
In this paper we investigate the TEP protocol in order to determine whether
its correctness depends on the values chosen for the unspecified parameters. In
other words, we analyze the protocol by varying the values of these parameters
in order to find out if there exists a combination for which correctness is no
longer guaranteed. Our analysis is done by using the Spin model-checker. We
have modeled the essential part of the protocol (known as the Temper-Evident
Announcement), and used this model to hunt for potentially dangerous combi-
nations of parameters, which indeed appeared to exist. The next step was to
explore the vulnerability boundaries, by deriving a closed predicate relating the
parameters to eachother and providing a safety criterion. The derivation of this
predicate, and the verification of the resulting safety criterion, was done by us-
ing the model-checker. The contribution of our work is twofold. First, it reveals
a vulnerability of a protocol that was ‘proven to be correct’. And secondly, it
shows how model-checking can be used, not only to track down bugs, but also
to establish side-conditions that are essential for the protocol to work properly.
2 Tamper-Evident Pairing
The Wi-Fi Alliance has set the Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) standard in [27].
The standard provides several options for simple configuration of security set-
tings for Wi-Fi networks (pairing). One of them is Push-Button Configura-
tion (PBC), where two devices (enrollee and registrar) are paired by pressing a
(possibly virtual) button on each of the devices within a time-out period of two
minutes. Security of this method is enclosed in the fact that the user needs phys-
ical access to both devices. However, in [8], three vulnerabilities are described
creating opportunity for man-in-the-middle attacks:
1. Collision: An attacker can create a collision with the enrollee’s message and
send his own message immediately after.
2. Capture effect: An attacker can transmit a message at a much higher
power than the enrollee. Capture effects were first described in [26].
3. Timing control: an attacker can occupy the medium, prohibiting the en-
rollee from sending his message, and send his own message in-between.
Gollakota et al also provide an innovative solution to the PBC security prob-
lems in [8]. Their alternative pairing protocol is named Tamper-Evident Pair-
ing (TEP). It is based on the fact that Wi-Fi devices can not only receive packets,
but also simply measure the energy on the channel, as part of the 802.11 stan-
dard requirements. This provides the opportunity to encode a bit of information
as a time-slot where energy is present or absent on the wireless medium. Under
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the assumption that an attacker does not have the ability to remove energy from
the medium, this means that an attacker cannot turn an on-slot into an off-slot.
Let us start by explicating the attacker model, i.e. the assumptions about
the adversary that we are securing the protocol against. The presence of an
active adversary is assumed, who is trying to launch a MITM attack. She has
the following capabilities:
Overwrite data packets The adversary can use any of the three vulnerabili-
ties listed above to overwrite data packets.
Introduce energy on the channel The adversary can introduce energy on
the channel. Energy cannot be eliminated from the wireless medium.
2.1 The Tamper-Evident Announcement
To facilitate TEP, Gollakota et al introduce the Tamper-Evident Announce-
ment (TEA) primitive, which is sent in both directions: enrollee to registrar
and vice-versa. The structure of a TEA is given in Fig. 1. It starts with the
so-called synchronization packet. This an exceptionally long packet, filled with
random data. It is detected by the receiver by measuring a burst of energy on
the medium of at least its length (so in a manner similar to the on-off slots).










Fig. 1: The structure of a Tamper-Evident Announcement (TEA)
The synchronization packet is followed by the payload of the TEA, which
contains the Diffie-Hellman public key [6] of the sender. Then, a CTS-to-self
packet is sent. This message is part of the IEEE 802.11 specification and requests
all other Wi-Fi devices not to transmit during a certain time period, here the
time needed for the remainder of the TEA.
Finally, a hash of the payload is sent by either transmitting or refraining from
transmitting during a series of so-called on-off slots. An attacker cannot change
an on-slot into an off-slot, because she cannot remove energy from the medium,
but she might still do the opposite. To be able to detect this as well, a specially
crafted bit-balancing algorithm is applied to the 128-bit hash, prolonging it to
142 bits (71 zeros and 71 ones). Now, when an off-slot is changed into an on-
slot, the balance between on and off slots is disturbed, making the tampering
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detectable. The 142-bit bit-balanced hash is preceded by two bits representing
the direction of the TEA (enrollee to registrar or vice-versa). So, in total, 144
slots are sent.
2.2 Receiving the Slots
The sender sends out the 144 slots, which take 40 µs each, back-to-back. On the
receiver-side the slots are received by measuring energy on the wireless medium.
The receiver iteratively measures the energy on the medium, during so-called
sensing windows of 20 µs. The total number of measurements m during the
sensing window is stored, as well as the number of measurements e during which
there was energy on the medium. If the fractional occupancy, given by e/m, is
above a certain threshold then the medium is considered occupied during this
particular sensing window.
Sent hash
Energy on the medium
Fractional occupancy of the 
even/odd sensing windows


















Fig. 2: Sending and receiving the slots of a 4-bit hash. The even sensing windows
have the higher variance here. Therefore, those represent the received hash. Clock
skew is shown in blue on the left.
The length of a sensing window is half the slot-length. The reason for this is
that now either all the even sensing windows or all the odd sensing windows fall
entirely within a slot, i.e. do not cross slot-boundaries, shown in Fig. 2, where
the even sensing windows all fall entirely within one of the 40 µs slots. Note that
the figure shows the ideal case, where measurements are exact. In reality the
measurements will be less than perfect, which motivates the use of a threshold.
The use of this special method of receiving the slots is motivated by the fact
that there may be a slight clock-skew. This is shown in Fig. 2 on the lower-left.
After all the measurements are done and after applying the threshold, the
receiver verifies that either the even or the odd sensing windows have an equal
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number of zeros and ones3, and that those match a calculated hash of the payload
packet. If this is not the case, then the receiver aborts the pairing process.
3 Modeling the Tamper-Evident Announcement in Spin
We use the same attacker model as the authors of [8], listed in Sect. 2. Given
that an adversary can replace the payload packet, we will try to verify that
she cannot adapt the bits of the hash that are received without being detected.
Namely, if the attacker manages to send her own payload and adapt the hash
such that it matches her payload and contains an equal number of zeros and
ones, she can initiate a MITM attack. The payload packet itself is therefore not
part of the model. We will only model the sending of the bit-balanced hash. The
direction bits (i.e. the first two slots) are also not modeled. Gollakota et al. give
an informal proof of the security of TEP in [8]. Effectively, we are challenging
Proposition 7.2 of their proof.
We have used Spin [9] for the verification of the model. This section con-
tains some illustrative simplified fragments from the model only. The full model
(including results) can be downloaded from http://www.cs.ru.nl/R.Kersten/
publications/nfm/.
3.1 Model Parameters
The model has a series of parameters that are described in this section.
Hash length The length of the bit-balanced hash to send. All possible hashes
of this length that are bit-balanced are tried (the balancing algorithm itself
is not part of the model).
Number of measurements per sensing window The number of measure-
ments in each sensing window depends on the Wi-Fi hardware on which the
protocol is implemented. The length of the window is 20 µs. During each
window, the hardware logs the total number of clock-ticks, as well as the
number of clock-ticks during which there was energy on the wireless medium.
The number of measurements during each sensing window is thus variable.
In the model though, the number of measurements is fixed and given by a
parameter. The reason for this is that a variable number of measurements
would highly enlarge the state-space, the number of measurements is not
something that an adversary can influence and that we believe it will be
fairly constant in practice. A programmer implementing the protocol could
measure or calculate the average number of measurements during a sensing
window and use a “safe” approximation (a little lower) in the formula. In
3 Actually, the variance of all the even sensing window measurements and that of all
the odd sensing window measurements is calculated. The sensing windows with the
higher variance will be the correct ones, since on and off slots are balanced. It is
however not clear to us what the advantage of this approach is over simply selecting
the sensing windows in which the on-off slots are balanced.
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our model, the sender puts energy on the wireless medium for the number
of clock-ticks it takes to do the measurements for two sensing windows (the
sensing window has half the length of an on-off slot). This means that one
measurement is the unit for a clock-tick.
Sensing window threshold As explained in Sect. 2.2, bits are received by
measuring the fractional occupancy during a sensing window. It is deter-
mined whether or not the medium was occupied in a sensing window by
checking if the fractional occupancy is above a certain threshold. The value
of this threshold is not defined in [8], although it influences the measure-
ments heavily. Since the number of measurements during a sensing window
is constant in the model, we can omit the calculation of the fractional occu-
pancy. This means that also the threshold should now be modeled, not as
a number between 0 and 1, but as a number between 0 and the number of
sensing window measurements and that its unit is clock-ticks (the medium
was occupied during e ticks of the discrete clock). If the number of mea-
surements (clock-ticks) in a sensing window where there was energy on the
medium exceeds the threshold, then a one is stored for this sensing window.
Skew The reason for the use of pairs of sensing windows for receiving the slots
is that there may be an inherent clock skew. It is stated in [8] that this
inherent clock skew may be up to 10 µs, i.e. half the sensing window length.
By using pairs of sensing windows, either the even or the odd windows are
guaranteed not to cross slot-boundaries. Furthermore, it is stated in [8] that
to detect a TEA it is sufficient to detect a burst of energy “at least as
long as the synchronization packet”. It is not specified which is the exact
synchronization point: the beginning or the end of the energy pulse. Neither
is the maximum length of an energy burst that signifies a synchronization
packet. The difference with the given length of 19ms introduces an extra
skew. Since an adversary can introduce energy to the wireless medium, she
can prolong the synchronization packet and introduce extra skew (the sign
of this skew depends on the choice of synchronization point). The model
variable skew is the total of the inherent clock skew and this attacker skew.
Like the number of measurements and the threshold, its unit is also clock-
ticks. We only consider positive skew (forward in time) in our model.
These parameters to the model are henceforth referred to as hash length,
sw measurements, threshold and skew, respectively.
3.2 Clock Implementation
Timing is essential to modeling the TEA. However, Spin has no inherent notion
of time. Luckily, in this case the exact scheduling and execution speed are not
important, as the only interaction between the sender and receiver processes is
sending energy to and reading the energy-level from the wireless medium. The
receiver observes the value of the wireless medium once per clock cycle, the
sender updates it at most once.
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Due to these properties we can implement a discrete clock in Promela (the
modeling language used by Spin), without the need to use specialized model-
checkers with native clock support. We introduce a separate clock process, which
waits until all processes using a clock are finished with a clock cycle (Listing 1,
line 17), before signaling them to continue. Processes are signaled to continue by
flipping the Boolean clock (line 23). Processes can only continue with the next
clock cycle if this variable differs from their local variable localclock (line 10),
which is also flipped after each clock-tick (line 11). Our clock implementation
also supports processes which do not use a clock. A clock-tick in the model
corresponds to a measurement taken by the receiver. To avoid the situation that
the receiver executes before the sender, we implemented explicit turns for the
processes, so the sender always executes first after a clock-tick. The process with
the lowest process identifier is always executed first (line 7). We can introduce
skew by letting one of the processes wait a number of clock-ticks before starting.
1 byte wait ing = 0 ;
2 bool c l o ck = fa l se ;
3 #define useClock ( ) bool l o c a l c l o c k = fa l se ;
4
5 inl ine waitTicks ( procID , numberOfTicks ) {
6 byte t i c k ;
7 f o r ( t i c k : 0 . . ( numberOfTicks−1)) {
8 wai t ing++;
9 atomic {
10 l o c a l c l o c k != c l o ck ;
11 l o c a l c l o c k = c lock ;





17 proctype c lockProc ( ) {
18 end :
19 do
20 : : atomic {
21 wai t ing ==NUMBER OF CLOCK PROCESSES;
22 wai t ing = 0 ;




Listing 1: Modeling the clock. The useClock and waitTicks functions must be
used in processes that use the clock.
3.3 Model Processes
The model begins with a routine that generates all possible hashes of the given
length non-deterministically. It then starts four processes:
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Clock A simple clock process is used to control the other processes. The clock
process is described in Sect. 3.2.
Sender The sender process first initializes and starts the clock. It then itera-
tively sends a bit of the generated hash (by putting energy on the medium,
or not), waits for 2 · sw measurements clock-ticks, then sends the next bit.
When finished sending, the sender must keep the clock ticking, because the
receiver process might still be running.
1 proctype sender ( ) {
2 useClock ( ) ;
3 waitTicks (0 , 1 ) ;
4 byte i ;
5 f o r ( i : 0 . . (HASH LENGTH−1)) {
6 mediumSender = get ( i ) ; // send s l o t
7 waitTicks (0 , SW MEASUREMENTS∗2 ) ;
8 }
9 doneWithClock ( 0 ) ;
10 }
Listing 2: Sender model.
Receiver The receiver also begins with initializing and starting the clock. It
then introduces clock skew by waiting more skew ticks. Then, it measures
energy on the medium sw measurements times (once each clock-tick) and
stores the received bit for each sensing window (one if e is above threshold).
Note that the wireless medium consists of two bits: one that is set by the
legitimate sender and one that is set by the adversary. The receiver reads
energy if either bit is set. Once measurements for all sensing windows are
done, the checkHash() function verifies if either the even or the odd sensing
windows have an equal number of on and off slots.
1 r e c e i v e r ( ) {
2 useClock ( ) ;
3 waitTicks (1 , SKEW+1);
4 short sw ;
5 f o r ( sw : 0 . . (HASH LENGTH∗2−1)) {
6 byte e = 0 , t i c k s = 0 ;
7 f o r ( t i c k s : 0 . . (SW MEASUREMENTS−1)) {
8 e = e + ( mediumSender | | mediumAdversary ) ;
9 waitTicks (1 , 1 ) ;
10 }
11 s t o r e ( sw , e>THRESHOLD) ;
12 }
13 checkHash ( ) ;
14 }
Listing 3: Receiver model.
Adversary The adversary is modeled as a simple process that increases the
energy on the medium, then decreases it again. Because processes may be
interleaved in any possible way, this verifies all scenarios.
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1 proctype adversary ( ) {
2 end :
3 do
4 : : mediumAdversary = 1 ;
5 mediumAdversary = 0 ;
6 od
7 }
Listing 4: Adversary model.
4 Model-Checking Results
Verification of the model means stating the assertion that either the received
hash is equal to the sent hash or it is not equal, but the tampering by the
adversary is detected (because the number of ones in the hash is unequal to the
number of zeros). It is thus a search for a counter-example.
The expectation was that we might be able to find such a counter-example,
but that the freedom with which an adversary could modify the received hash
would be limited, probably to just the first or last bit. Model-checking indeed
generated a counter-example. Moreover, experimentation with different asser-
tions turned out that the adversary actually has more freedom in modifying
the hash than expected. This vulnerability is described in Sect. 4.1. After the
vulnerability was discovered, we executed a large series of Spin runs to discover
what the exact conditions are that enable such an attack. The results are given
in Sect. 4.2.
4.1 Revealed Vulnerability in the TEA
Model-checking the TEA model using Spin generated a counter-example to the
assertion that a hash that was modified by an adversary will not be accepted by
the receiver. A scenario similar to the one for which this counter-example was
found is shown in Fig. 3.
Figure 3 shows the case where no adversary is active. Here, the even sensing
windows still have the higher variance (1001 versus 0010). Thus, those are chosen
as the correct slots and the hash 1001 is received, which is equal to the sent hash.
In Fig. 4 a scenario is shown in which an adversary actively introduces energy
on the wireless medium. The energy that is introduced by the attacker is shown as
a dotted blue line. She manages to trick the receiver into choosing the odd sensing
windows and consequently receive a modified hash: 1010. Experimentation with
modified assertions has confirmed our conjecture that an adversary can use this
tactic to change any 1 bit in the hash to a 0, if and only if it is immediately
followed by a 0. Since the hash is bit-balanced, it consists of 50% zeros and 50%
ones. Of the latter category, half are followed by 0 bits on average. This means
that an adversary can change on average 75% of the hash.
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Sent hash
Energy on the medium




















Fig. 3: Scenario in which TEP is vulnerable, for a 4-bit hash. The synchronization
packet is prolonged to create a skew that is larger than the half the sensing
window. The hash is still received correctly here.
Sent hash
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Fig. 4: The attack found by model checking, for a 4-bit hash. The adversary
introduces energy to the medium to change the received hash to 1010.
4.2 Varying the Values of the Model Parameters
After discovering the vulnerability described in the previous section, we wanted
to investigate what the exact circumstances are in which the vulnerability oc-
curs. We therefore ran the Spin model-checker for many different values of the
parameters hash length, sw measurements, threshold and skew4. Some of the
results are shown in Table 1. As it turns out, the length of the hash has no influ-
ence on the occurrence of the vulnerability, so this is omitted from the results.
Remember that the unit for all three parameters in the table is clock-ticks.
4 In order to run the Spin model-checker for various values of defined parameters, we
have implemented a small wrapper in the form a of C program. This wrapper can
be obtained from http://www.open.ou.nl/bvg/spinbatch/.
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threshold = 3
skew
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
4 + - - - - - - - - - -
5 + + - - - - - - - - -
6 + + + - - - - - - - -
sw meas. 7 + + + + - - - - - - -
8 + + + + + - - - - - -
9 + + + + + + - - - - -
10 + + + + + + + - - - -
(a) Results for threshold = 3.
threshold = 5
skew
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
6 + - - - - - - - - - -
7 + + - - - - - - - - -
sw meas. 8 + + + - - - - - - - -
9 + + + + - - - - - - -
10 + + + + + - - - - - -
(b) Results for threshold = 5.
threshold = 7
skew
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
8 + - - - - - - - - - -
sw meas. 9 + + - - - - - - - - -
10 + + + - - - - - - - -
(c) Results for threshold = 7.
threshold = 9
skew
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
sw meas. 10 + - - - - - - - - - -
(d) Results for threshold = 9.
Table 1: Model-checking results. Pluses indicate that the proposition is not bro-
ken. Minuses indicate the occurrence of the vulnerability.
It is obvious from Table 1 that the following predicate determines the possi-
bility of an attack:
skew ≥ sw measurements− threshold (1)
In Fig. 4, a threshold of 0.5 is used, which is represented by a value for
threshold of 12 · sw measurements in the model. If the skew is large enough to
move a number of threshold measurements of the even windows over the sensing
window boundary, then an adversary might change the received hash. We have
model-checked the predicate for all combinations of sw measurements 1–10,
threshold 1–10 and skew 1–10.
5 Related Work
Before the Spin model on which this article is based was made, a simple model of
the TEA and TEP in UPPAAL was made by Drijvers [7]. UPPAAL is a tool with
which properties about systems modeled as networks of timed automata can be
verified [3]. Because of the simple nature of this model, it did not include clock
skew and therefore did not reveal the vulnerability that was later found using
Spin. Apart from the TEA, Drijvers made a separate model of the overlying TEP,
with which – under the assumption that the TEA is secure – no problems were
identified. Since TEP was already successfully model-checked using UPPAAL
and, contrary to the TEA model, not in a highly abstract form (it is much
simpler), we chose not to repeat the modeling for Spin.
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In [5] a method is proposed for modeling a discrete clock in Promela, without
the need to alter Spin. Instead of an alternating Boolean, time is modeled as
an integer which negatively impacts the state space explosion. Just as with
our approach a separate clock is introduced, which waits until all the other
processes are finished, before increasing the discrete clock variable. This waiting
is modeled with a native feature of Promela, which only continues if no other
state-transition can be made (the timeout keyword). Therefore, all the processes
are implicitly using the modeled clock. Because of our general adversary process,
this restriction is too severe for us.
Many approaches to pairing wireless devices are described in the literature.
A comparison of various wireless pairing protocols is given in [24]. Often, a
trusted out-of-band channel is used to transfer (the hash of) an encryption key,
e.g. a human [10], direct electrical contact [23], Near-Field Communication [17],
(ultra)sound [16], laser [18], visual/barcodes [20], et cetera. A nice overview is
given in [11]. Another, slightly out-dated, overview is given in [22]. In TEP, a
hash of the key is communicated in a trustedly secure manner in-band.
When using the PIN method that Wi-Fi Protected Setup provides, one of the
devices displays an eight-digit authentication code, which the user then needs
to enter on the other device. This method thus requires a screen and some sort
of input device. The PIN method has been shown to be vulnerable to feasible
brute-force attacks by Viehbo¨ck in [25]. The reason for this is that last digit is
actually a check-sum of the first seven digits (i.e. there are only seven digits to
verify) and, moreover, that the PIN is verified in two steps. The result of the
verification of the first four digits is sent back to the enrollee, which may then
send three more digits if this result was positive. This reduces the number of
codes to try in a brute-force attack from 107 to 104 + 103. A successful attack
can be executed in approximately two hours on average. CERT-CC has urged
users to disable the WPS feature on their wireless access points in response to
this vulnerability5. A security and usability analysis of Wi-Fi Protected Setup,
as well as Bluetooth Simple Pairing, which is similar, is given in [12].
Approaches to model-checking security protocols are described in [13] and [2].
In [14], a series of XSS and SQL injection attacks is detected using model-
checking. Model-checking and theorem proving of security properties are dis-
cussed in [15]. In [19], security issues that arise from combining hosts in a
network are investigated using model-checking. An entire Linux distribution is
model-checked against security violations in [21].
6 Conclusions
The effects of a number of decisions to be made when implementing Tamper-
Evident Pairing have been studied. In particular, the sending of a hash by using
on-off slots – in which energy is present or absent on the wireless medium –
was modeled. The values of several essential parameters of the protocol have not
5 http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/723755
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been adequately specified. Model checking proved to be very effective both in
uncovering a serious vulnerability for certain values of these parameters and in
finding a predicate on the parameters indicating for which values the vulnerabil-
ity is present. An adversary aiming to initiate a man-in-the-middle attack can
thus evidently tamper with the received hash.
Future work could include extending the model to cover more of the TEA
and investigate the feasibility of exploiting the found vulnerability. Furthermore,
a full formal proof that the found vulnerability cannot occur when the predicate
is not satisfied would be very valuable.
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